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RESURRECTING THE PUBLIC VOICE: THE EXPANSION OF
STANDING IN PATENT LITIGATION
ABSTRACT
The Federal Circuit’s dismissal of Consumer Watchdog’s appeal in 2014
illustrates a systemic shortcoming of standing in patent law. More specifically,
the current implementation of the federal standing doctrine in patent litigation
prevents public interest organizations from litigating the validity of patents.
This shortcoming appears in spite of the fact that the patent system exists as a
public endorsement of a private right in exchange for a purported social
contribution on the part of the inventor and her invention.
Instead of constructing an ill-fated legislative solution, this Comment
suggests that the shortcoming may be overcome through action at the Patent
Office. More specifically, the Patent Office, in promulgating rules relating to
its internal operation, may establish a committee to recognize certain public
interest organizations for membership in a special program. That program
would offer those select organizations—chosen on the basis of meritorious
criteria and for a limited term—the opportunity to submit themselves to
monetary penalty upon losing an inter partes reexamination. The monetary loss
then constitutes an injury in fact, the baseline requirement for appeal from
administrative action.
Indeed, this proposal not only meets the reduced requirements of an appeal
from the agency but also arguably fulfills all the constitutional, prudential, and
policy considerations inherent in the federal standing doctrine. Thus, this
Comment proposes an immediately viable method for resurrecting the public
voice in patent litigation, further allowing the public to speak out regarding its
will in social and technological development.

BLEVINS GALLEYSPROOFS2

894

2/25/2016 10:08 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:893

INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Consumer Watchdog, “a nonprofit organization dedicated to
providing an effective voice for taxpayers and consumers,”1 challenged a
patent sought by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) through
inter partes reexamination2 at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).3
Despite its interference, the PTO ruled in favor of WARF and granted the
patent, a ruling which Consumer Watchdog appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.4
The injury cited by Consumer Watchdog changed during the course of
litigation. The patent itself involved developments surrounding embryonic
stem cell research, so initially Consumer Watchdog was primarily concerned
that “the ‘913 patent allowed WARF to completely preempt all uses of human
embryonic stem cells, particularly those for scientific and medical research.”5
In its appeal, though, Consumer Watchdog cited “a severe burden on
taxpayer-funded research in the State of California where [Consumer
Watchdog] is located.”6 Finally, in the course of pretrial filings, the
organization decided that its injury flowed from being barred from further inter
partes reexaminations as a result of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences’ (BPAI) ruling.7
Addressing Consumer Watchdog’s assertion, the Federal Circuit quickly
decided that this final cited injury was inadequate to establish Article III
standing:

1

About, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/about (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
Inter partes reexamination permitted third-party interference in the validity of granted patents under
the 2006 version of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2006). In 2012, the America Invents Act (AIA)
replaced this provision with a mechanism called inter partes review, a more liberalized version of inter partes
reexamination established by the old Act. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2012); JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT
LAW 433 (4th ed. 2013). In this Comment, though, both provisions will be discussed as inter partes
reexamination for simplicity.
3 Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Patent of Wis. Alumni Research Found.,
No. 2012-011693, 2013 WL 5397843 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 22, 2013).
4 Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
5 Id.
6 Id. (alteration in original).
7 See Brief of Appellant in Response to United States at 3, Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258
(No. 2013-1377), 2014 WL 534827 (noting the estoppel from further reexamination and stating that the appeal
challenges “the PTO’s specific action of . . . issuing a decision with which CW was dissatisfied in the
reexamination”). Please note also that, under the new AIA regime, the BPAI has been renamed the Patent Trial
and Appeals Board. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). For the purposes of this Comment, though, the moniker BPAI
will apply to both.
2
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Consumer Watchdog is not engaged in any activity that would give
rise to a possible infringement suit. Nor does Consumer Watchdog
provide any indication that it would file another request seeking to
cancel claims at the Patent Office. In any event, as Consumer
Watchdog only has a general grievance against the ‘913 patent, the
“conjectural or hypothetical’ nature of any injury flowing from the
estoppel provisions is insufficient to confer standing . . . .8

This rejection conveys the principles of standing both in patent law and in
federal jurisdiction more broadly.9 In deciding to dismiss, the Federal Circuit
gave no weight to the fact that the plaintiff was a public interest organization,
albeit a self-proclaimed one, and simply relied on the fact that Consumer
Watchdog did not identify “a particularized, concrete interest in the
patentability of the ‘913 patent, or any injury in fact flowing from the [BPAI]’s
decision.”10
Consumer Watchdog’s nearly comical carousel of cited injuries constitutes
the organization’s legitimate attempts to overcome a shortcoming in federal
jurisdiction as it relates to patent law. Indeed, WARF is the latest in a line of
cases demonstrating a growing interest on the part of public interest
organizations in patent litigation.11 This trend should both please and benefit
the public for reasons aptly demonstrated by a somewhat absurd hypothetical.
Consider a circumstance in which a U.S. pharmaceutical company,
Pharmacorp, develops a drug that cures every ailment from HIV to gout to
stage fright, all with a single oral dose. Naturally trying to capitalize on its
miraculous invention, Pharmacorp applies for a patent and intends to charge
over $1,000,000 per dose. The public has a vested interest in access to this
miracle drug, but at such an immense price, the availability of its benefits will
be severely limited until the patent term expires. As a result, a public interest
organization may choose to challenge the validity of the patent, first at the
PTO and, if unsuccessful there, in federal court.
As demonstrated in WARF, no such appeal would be available to a public
interest organization, the inter partes challenge of which fell short. In patent
8

Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1262–63.
See infra Part II.A.
10 Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1263.
11 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (involving a
challenge to the validity of patents relating to medical genetic sequencing techniques originally filed by the
ACLU); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(noting the ACLU as representing plaintiffs); see also Amelia Smith Rinehart, Patent Cases and Public
Controversies, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 361, 362 (2013).
9
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law, courts have interpreted the broadly defined federal standing doctrine to
practically12 require infringing activity and threat of suit in order to establish
standing.13 This narrow interpretation effectively precludes public interest
organizations from satisfying the standing requirement in patent cases. In the
above hypothetical, no public interest organization engages in the research,
development, and production of pharmaceuticals such that it could infringe on
Pharmacorp’s patents for the purposes of federal standing. Such organizations
currently try to avoid the standing issue by encouraging companies in the same
industry to bring suits and thereafter join those suits.14 However, most
companies have a very strong incentive to forgo such challenges. Consider
DrugCo, a competitor of Pharmacorp, challenging the patentability of the
miracle drug based on the argument that the drug’s immense social benefit
somehow takes it beyond the realm of patentable subject matter. This socialbenefit argument would likely spell trouble for DrugCo’s own patents.
Companies may actively shirk socially beneficial challenges to patents because
of this risk. As a result, public interest organizations, and transitively the public
generally, are denied recourse to defend the interests of the populous beyond
the walls of the PTO following a loss before the BPAI.15 Further, due to the
above-described corporate self-interest, certain worthwhile patent challenges
may be underrepresented as companies try to protect their own patent
portfolios, weakening the patent system as a whole.
This Comment proposes a system whereby the PTO may resurrect the
public voice in patent litigation by expanding standing to include public
12 This “practically” modifier is in place because the Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., though dealing primarily with declaratory judgment jurisdiction, theoretically broadened the standing
doctrine in patent law. 549 U.S. 118 (2007). In practice, however, the MedImmune test has been applied almost
identically to the old test mentioned here. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
13 MUELLER, supra note 2, at 601. Part I.A below covers the current application of the standing doctrine
in patent litigation in greater detail.
14 Rinehart, supra note 11, at 362.
15 Statistics showing the relative success of inter partes reexaminations versus ex parte reexaminations
demonstrate the importance of an adversarial system in challenging patent validity. Roger Shang, Inter Partes
Reexamination and Improving Patent Quality, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 185, 192 (2009) (showing a
“59% all-cancellation rate [of patent claims through inter partes reexamination as] compared [to] the 10%
all-cancellation rate of ex parte reexamination”). Shortcomings persist even in the adversarial inter partes
system, though—most notably, for the purposes of this Comment, in the limited permissible grounds of
reexamination. Paul Morgan & Bruce Stoner, Reexamination vs. Litigation: Making Intelligent Decisions in
Challenging Patent Validity, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441, 455 (2004) (noting that challenges are
limited to those based on prior art); see also Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 219, 236 (2011) (“Additionally, there is no opportunity for defendants to cross-examine and
depose inventors during inter partes reexamination, . . . [so] they must rely solely on written documents to
invalidate a patent.”).
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interest organizations. To do so, the PTO should recognize a handful16 of
public interest organizations that may voluntarily subject themselves to
potential monetary injury by challenging patents through inter partes
reexamination. The monetary injury flowing from a failed challenge would
confer standing to challenge the ruling of the BPAI—as opposed to directly
challenging the validity of the patent itself—allowing the issue of validity to be
transitively litigated once more.17 Part I of this Comment introduces the current
application of the standing doctrine in challenging patents and discusses the
underlying policies of patent law. In so doing, Part I introduces the
shortcomings of the current standing doctrine and identifies the pillars of
patent law principles on which any modifications to the current doctrine must
be constructed. Part II then explores the legal frameworks implicated in such a
proposal, namely federal standing doctrine and issues in administrative law
relating to the expansion of the PTO’s capabilities. Part III outlines the
proposed system in detail and discusses its potential implications with respect
to the underlying concerns of federal standing and patent law. This Comment
then concludes by discussing the viability of this proposal, its potential impact
on the patent system, and its societal effects.
I. PATENT LAW, STANDING, AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE
This Comment presents a proposal for creating standing in patent litigation
specifically for public interest organizations. While the proposal does not
implicate a change to patent law per se, a discussion of some basic principles
of patent law will help facilitate an understanding of the motivation and
significance of the proposed change. This Part provides the necessary
background for such an understanding. First, section A explains the current
application of the standing doctrine in patent law, emphasizing the lack of
standing afforded to public interest organizations. Then, section B explores the
role of public interest in patent law and its underlying policy to lend further

16 This limitation is not arbitrary; it honors federal standing policy by limiting the workload of the courts
to ensure they hear meaningful disputes. See infra Part II.A.4. The notion of a “handful” is discussed more
specifically below. See infra Part III.A (discussing organizations to which opportunities to participate will be
offered).
17 This Comment focuses on the procedural standing to litigate and not on the substantive grounds on
which a patent may be challenged. For the sake of space, then, neither the law relating to patentability nor the
potential grounds for a claim of invalidity in the public interest context are explored in this Comment in any
depth. However, only certain challenges to patent validity are available through inter partes review, which
serves to limit the increase in litigation that would come as a result of this proposal. See infra Part III.B.I.
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strength to the argument—first for change generally and second for the
worthiness of the specific change proposed herein.
A. Limited Standing in Current Patent Litigation
This Comment sets out to establish standing for public interest
organizations to challenge the validity of patents in federal court. Generally
speaking, plaintiffs in patent law seek declaratory judgments in such
challenges, so the present discussion of standing in patent law will be limited
to standing relating to patent cases seeking declaratory judgments. In these
cases, the relevant precedent largely flows from decisions of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.18
The Federal Circuit initially narrowed the broad federal standing doctrine
to a single, two-part test of justiciability in cases seeking declaratory
judgments of patent invalidity. Plaintiffs had standing to seek declaratory
judgments of invalidity when the following two conditions were met: (1) the
plaintiff reasonably believed that she was under immediate threat of suit, and
(2) she was engaging in or taking steps towards the activity which created the
basis for that potential infringement suit.19 Simplified, the Federal Circuit
required both that a plaintiff alleging invalidity was either practicing a patent
or intending to do so such that she could be sued for patent infringement and
that the plaintiff believed that such an infringement suit was imminent.20 For
instance, in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed that Teva, while engaging in activity that may constitute
infringement, failed to show that its company was under sufficient threat of
litigation from Pfizer to confer standing.21
The Supreme Court expanded the notion of standing in challenging patent
validity in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.22 In MedImmune, the plaintiff
argued that it was coerced into continued payment of royalties by a fear of

18 The Federal Circuit hears all appeals from rulings of the BPAI and from trials involving patent law in
federal district court. MUELLER, supra note 2, at 40. Thus, much of the interpretation and court-made additions
to patent law have come from the Federal Circuit. Id. at 40–41.
19 Id. at 601; Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Amana
Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
20 Teva, 395 F.3d at 1333 (“In order for this case to be one fit for judicial review, Teva must be able to
demonstrate that it has a reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.”).
21 Id. at 1338.
22 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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infringement litigation.23 The Court determined that this injury conferred
standing upon the plaintiff, holding that the Federal Circuit’s two-part test was
too narrowly construed.24 More specifically, the Court found that the two-part
test contravened other Supreme Court precedent and should thus be
eliminated.25 In its stead, the Court applied what can be called the “all the
circumstances” test, whereby “the question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.”26 Accordingly the Federal Circuit has since adjudged
the case-or-controversy requirement of standing by replacing the old two-part
test with the “all the circumstances” test from the MedImmune decision.27
Despite the apparent added leniency in the new test, though, courts have
applied the new test in practically identical ways to that of the old two-prong
“reasonable apprehension of imminent suit” from Teva and others.28
As a result, public interest organizations still lack the capacity to meet the
court-made test for standing in patent litigation, even in the wake of the
illusory loosening in MedImmune. As highlighted in WARF, public interest
organizations generally do not engage in the production of goods such that
they could reasonably infringe on the patents they may wish to challenge.29 As
a consequence, neither do the companies—the patents of which these public
interest organizations wish to challenge—have any reason to consider bringing
suit against them. Public interest organizations, then, find themselves
23

Id. at 122.
Id. at 132 n.11.
25 Id.; see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (2007)
(confirming that the Supreme Court had overruled the “reasonable apprehension of imminent suit” test in its
MedImmune decision).
26 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
(1941)).
27 MUELLER, supra note 2, at 604; see, e.g., Novartis, 482 F.3d at 1339. Article III requirements of a
justiciable case or controversy are discussed more generally in Part II.A.1 of this Comment.
28 Rinehart, supra note 11, at 364. Rinehart notes that courts have been reluctant to recognize atypical
bases for standing beyond what would have already been adequate to confer standing under the
pre-MedImmune doctrine. Id.; see, e.g., Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Some decisions have gone so far as to apply something very near to the old test as a reflection of the new,
requiring “a showing of affirmative acts from the patentee indicating an intention to enforce his patent and
affirmative acts from the declaratory plaintiff indicating that she is ‘ready, willing and able’ to infringe the
patents” in order to confer standing. Rinehart, supra note 11, at 364 (quoting Arris Group, Inc. v. British
Telecomms. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
29 See, e.g., Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(noting that “Consumer Watchdog [was] not engaged in any activity that would give rise to a possible
infringement suit”).
24

BLEVINS GALLEYSPROOFS2

900

2/25/2016 10:08 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:893

marooned on an island of valid public concern with no ship of standing by
which they can reach a forum to challenge patent activity.
While this conundrum may appear vexing, the procedural differences
between cases like MedImmune and those like WARF yield the key to
constructing the standing that public interest organizations need and deserve30
to challenge the validity of patents. For instance, many challenges to patent
validity, including that which began the MedImmune litigation, originate in
federal district court.31 In contrast, the case in WARF came as an appeal from
the ruling of the BPAI within the PTO.32 MedImmune brought its case
pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act,33 which permits such challenges.
Consumer Watchdog, on the other hand, brought its case pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 319,34 which provides for a right to appeal the decisions of the
BPAI.35 Appeals of the latter type have relaxed standing requirements which
Part II.A explores in greater detail, while the post-MedImmune test applies
particularly to appeals of the former type.36 In this light, the mention of
Consumer Watchdog’s lack of infringing activity in WARF37 appears to simply
be contemplative dicta. Indeed, the court in WARF ultimately held that the
statutory estoppel provisions springing from the ruling of the BPAI failed to
confer standing for appeal upon Consumer Watchdog.38 This focus, along with
30 This Comment is predicated on the notion that public interest organizations accurately reflect and
represent the public voice. Thus, these organizations “deserve” the standing to challenge patents transitively
through their representation of the public, which itself merits judicial attention given the implicit public
endorsement in patents. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 122; see also MUELLER, supra note 2, at 42–47 (discussing the role
of district courts in patent litigation).
32 Compare MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 122, with Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1260.
33 Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012); MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 122.
34 See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012) (now providing for a right to appeal to the PTAB); Wis. Alumni Research
Found., 753 F.3d at 1260.
35 See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012); cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
36 See, e.g., Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 773 F.3d 1274, 1281–82 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (dismissing for lack of
standing). The Federal Circuit’s entire discussion of standing focused on the likelihood of infringement under
the immediacy and reality components of the “all the circumstances” test in MedImmune. Id. at 1279–80.
37 See, e.g., Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1261 (“Consumer Watchdog does not allege that
it is engaged in any activity involving human embryonic stem cells that could form the basis for an
infringement claim.”).
38 Id. at 1262. In other words, while a showing of infringing activity may have been adequate to establish
standing, the Federal Circuit did not rely on the absence thereof in dismissing the case. Rather, the alleged
harm was inadequate simply because “[t]he estoppel provisions contained within the inter partes reexamination
statute do not constitute an injury in fact for Article III purposes.” Id. at 1262. In reaching this conclusion, the
Federal Circuit discussed the federal standing doctrine’s development generally but never contended that
infringing activity, either actual or potential, was necessary to establish a case or controversy under Article III.
See generally id.
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the doctrine discussed in Part II below, suggests that appeals from decisions of
the BPAI simply have to show an adequate injury flowing from the ruling
under the broader federal standing doctrine, which may or may not fulfill the
post-MedImmune test required under the Declaratory Judgments Act. In short,
the distinction drawn between WARF and MedImmune is one of procedural
posture, with administrative appeals carrying less of a burden in demonstrating
standing.39
This distinction provides a key opening for creating standing for public
interest organizations in the landscape of appeals from administrative rulings.
Accordingly, the solution outlined in this Comment is narrowly circumscribed
only for cases reaching federal court as appeals from the BPAI. In such
circumstances, only the broader federal standing doctrine need be fulfilled—
plaintiffs’ cognizable injuries are not limited to those which stem from
infringing activity. Part II explores these nuances of the federal standing
doctrine in great detail. Regardless, any proposed solution must still observe
the principles underlying patent law in order for them to be viable, though,
even if that solution avoids implicating the typical standing doctrine for the
declaratory judgment cases common in patent law. Part B now explores those
principles in particular as they relate to the inclusion of the public voice in
patent litigation.
B. The Importance of Public Interest in Patent Law Policy
The U.S. government imbues patent holders with temporary exclusive
rights in exchange for the social benefit of the invention’s publication.40 These
social benefits take many forms. For instance, after its patent term expires, an
invention enters the public domain, allowing for its unlimited use and
production.41 Even during the patent term, the publication of the invention
allows for its study and further development by other inventors, and the
invention itself creates economic stimulation through the sale of a novel
product.42 Inventors may even design around patent claims to create

39 Part II.A.2 explores the advantages of this distinction and the lowered standing requirements for
appeals from administrative action.
40 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41 MUELLER, supra note 2, at 31.
42 Id. That said, given the lack of a robust experimental use defense, much of the experimental use
discussed here could technically constitute patent infringement. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in
Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 139–42 (2006).
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competition—to society’s economic and technological benefit—without
compromising the patent protections themselves.43
Therefore, broadly speaking, the entire system exists “to encourage the
promotion of progress to benefit the public as a whole.”44 While the patent
rights of a patentee must be protected, ideally those protections should only
extend to a degree adequate to encourage the continued use of the system and
no further.45 In other words, the protections tied to a patent are merely the
means to the end that is the public good, not another end unto themselves
necessarily.46 All that is not to say that inventors’ rights are irrelevant; the
patent system simply exists first to promote the interests of the public, the
users.47 Without diving headfirst into the rabbit hole that is the philosophical
exploration of benefit and value, the government should certainly be concerned
with accommodating the voice of the public in a system designed expressly for
its benefit.
Thus, patent law exists as a public protection of a private right created in
inventors.48 In other words, the public transitively provides the patent
protections to these inventors through the administrative arm of representative
government. Denying the public access to federal courts in contesting what the
public is endorsing through the granting of patents begins to resemble the
exclusion of shareholders from the right to speak to or influence the activities
of a corporation in which they are part owners. The notion is nonsensical.
Thus, the primary end of the patent system and the public endorsement
implicated in granted patents both suggest that the public should have a legal
recourse to challenge patent validity outside of the PTO. Beyond these
principles, recent judicial trends further support the notion that public voice
and public interest should have a greater role in patent law. For instance, the
43

Holbrook, supra note 42, at 139–42.
Rinehart, supra note 11, at 361 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
45 See MUELLER, supra note 2, at 31–32.
46 Id. at 30 (noting that “[p]atents are fundamentally incentive systems”); see also infra note 47.
47 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an
invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point—where
specific benefit exists in currently available form—there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant
to engross what may prove to be a broad field.”). For an interesting discussion on the quid pro quo of patents,
see also Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1074 (2014) (noting that “an
oft-touted justification for the patent system is that society will get some benefit from the invention’s
disclosure”).
48 See Rinehart, supra note 11, at 361.
44
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MedImmune decision constitutes part of this trend, liberalizing access to patent
litigation in theory if not in effect.49 Further, the Court’s 2006 decision in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC50 illustrates a liberalizing trend toward user
rights.51 The Supreme Court in eBay decided that the Federal Circuit had been
granting injunctions too readily, holding that the four-factor test for equitable
relief applies in patent law as much as it does elsewhere.52 In the wake of eBay,
courts grant injunctive relief significantly less frequently, favoring instead the
granting of damages in exchange for the continued infringing activity.53 This
trend demonstrates that the Court would rather supply a legal remedy in
exchange for continued infringing activity rather than enjoin defendants from
that activity in accordance with strict patent protections, arguably providing
compulsory licenses to infringers.54 Indeed, judicial decision-making perceived
as anti-patent-troll55 can be characterized as promoting user rights in the same
vein.56
Thus, expanding standing to challenge patents, even by circuitous methods,
honors the policy underlying patent law in addition to the current
jurisprudential trends therein. Though the proposal offered here does not
implicate a change in patent law itself, the concept flows from the principles of
the patent system and those displayed in the above judicial decisions.57

49

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
51 Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 197
(2008) (noting that no sources “have cited Justice Roberts’ concurrence as authority for upholding strong
patent rights”).
52 547 U.S. at 393–94.
53 Petersen, supra note 51, at 193.
54 Id. at 209–13.
55 Patent assertion entities, or patent trolls, are entities which acquire patents in order to enforce them on
users without practicing the patents themselves. See John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies,
85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 n.7 (2007).
56 See, e.g., Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (lowering the
standard for the award of attorney fees, making it easier for users to litigate to protect their user rights);
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (increasing the specificity requirements of patent
claims, largely eliminating ambiguous and broadly enforceable patent claims).
57 See infra Part III.A (introducing no new substantive grounds on which patents may be challenged).
Also noteworthy, the expansion of standing here could help monitor the patent system generally. See infra Part
III.
50
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IMPLICATED IN CHANGES TO PATENT-RELATED
STANDING
This Comment seeks to provide a basis for broadening standing in patent
litigation by expanding the authority of the PTO to allow for special
recognition of certain58 public interest groups. This remedy implicates two
areas of law, namely federal jurisdiction and administrative law. More
specifically, the doctrine of standing in federal court is contained within the
law of federal jurisdiction,59 and its effective amendment requires an
understanding both of its application and of its underlying policies. The
expansion of the PTO’s authority requires an examination of its place in
administrative law as a federal agency, and the authority with which it would
be empowered may implicate issues of constitutionality. This Part examines
each of these legal frameworks in the context of the remedy proposed in this
Comment.
A. The Doctrine of Standing and Its Application
The doctrine of justiciability controls those cases which federal courts have
authority to hear.60 Justiciability itself houses nested doctrines which determine
the conditions under which a case may be brought—namely standing, ripeness,
and mootness.61 However, the remedy proposed in this Comment is unlikely to
lead to a confrontation with ripeness or mootness;62 this section will therefore
focus on standing and its role in patent law. This section first explains the
rules, both constitutional and prudential, governing federal standing and
explores the policy implications behind them. Then, this section discusses the
mechanisms by which those requirements can be relaxed or waived. Next, this
section emphasizes the unwavering injury-in-fact requirement given its
fundamental nature to the area of law. Finally, the broader policies of standing

58

See supra note 16.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3, at 57 (5th ed. 2007).
60 Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
61 Id.
62 The doctrine of ripeness allows courts to eliminate claims based on overly speculative or otherwise
premature injuries. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.4.1, at 117 (5th ed. 2007) (stating that “ripeness centers
on whether [the claimed] injury has occurred yet”). The entire purpose of the remedy proposed in this
Comment, though, is to create a scheme in which injury is generated to grant Article III standing, so ripeness is
not of concern here. See infra Part III. The doctrine of mootness allows “federal courts to dismiss cases where
there no longer is a live controversy.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.1, at 45. However, with the scheme
proposed, the injury would persist until remedy is either granted or denied, so the issue of mootness would not
arise either. See infra Part III.
59
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are explored to ensure that, even where the remedy proposed in this Comment
does not abridge legal mechanisms, it does not abridge the doctrines
underlying the mechanisms either.
1. Aspects of Standing in Federal Court
Article III of the Constitution provides the basis for the doctrine of standing
in federal court.63 More specifically, Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 provides
that “judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this
Constitution . . . [and] Controversies between . . . Citizens of different
states.”64 Facially, this provision neither addresses the notion of “standing” nor
serves to limit the scope of federal adjudication in a very restrictive way.
However, federal courts have clarified and limited this scope through
judgments and have established certain doctrines to delineate which cases may
be heard.65 Most prominently, the Supreme Court has stated that “Article
III . . . restricts [judicial power] to the . . . [power] to redress or prevent actual
or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official
violation of law.”66 This delineation reflects “concern about the proper—and
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”67
Federal courts have promulgated multiple doctrines—namely standing,
ripeness, and mootness—in observance of this need for limitation.68
Specifically, standing requires a plaintiff to “‘allege[] such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his [or her] invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers
on his [or her] behalf.”69 Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating standing70
by satisfying three key requirements described in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife71:

63 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.1, at 45 (citing Article III as the basis for the doctrine of
standing).
64 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
65 Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1260.
66 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009).
67 Id. at 492–93 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
68 Summers, 555 U.S. at 493 (“The doctrine of standing is one of several doctrines that reflect this
fundamental limitation.”); Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1260 (“These doctrines—including
standing, ripeness, and mootness—distinguish justiciable cases from those that are not.”).
69 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
70 Summers, 555 U.S. at 493.
71 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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First, the party must show that it has suffered an “injury in fact” that
is both concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent (as
opposed to conjectural or hypothetical). Second, it must show that the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action. Third, the party
must show that it is likely, rather than merely speculative, that a
favorable judicial decision will redress the injury.72

These three requirements apply equally to cases on appeal and to cases on
trial.73
Because the PTO is an administrative agency, though, appeals to the
Federal Circuit from the BPAI do not originate in the district courts. While
neither the patent statute nor the APA—which governs the standard of review
for patent appeals—expressly includes standing requirements in its language
enabling judicial review,74 the need for standing also applies to cases that are
appealed from rulings of administrative agencies.75 This need persists despite
the fact that an appearance before an administrative agency does not require
such standing.76 Indeed, “Once a party seeks review in a federal court, ‘the
constitutional requirement that it have standing kicks in.’”77 Thus, parties who
contest administrative proceedings within the agency must satisfy the
requirements of standing to appeal or contest any agency rulings in federal
court.
Courts have traditionally applied further prudential requirements inherent
to standing in addition to its constitutional elements.78 Primary examples of
these prudential requirements include the following: a claim on the basis of an
72 Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1260–61 (emphasis added) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–
61); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)
(applying Lujan but separating “concrete and particularized” from “actual or imminent” as subparts of the
“injury in fact” requirement).
73 Id. at 1261 (citing Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013)).
74 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.”); 35 U.S.C. § 319 (“A party dissatisfied with the final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board under section 318(a) may appeal the decision pursuant to sections 141 through 144. Any party to the
inter partes review shall have the right to be a party to the appeal.”). But see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“Nothing
herein . . . affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or
deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground . . . .”).
75 Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1261 (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)); see also supra note 74.
76 Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1261.
77 Id. (quoting Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 899).
78 See id. (mentioning that “prudential aspects that are not part of Article III . . . may be relaxed” under
certain conditions).
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alleged violation of a statutory or constitutional provision must be within the
“zone of interests of the challenged provision”; grievances asserted must be
particular not generalized or shared by many people; and plaintiffs may not
bring suit to protect the interests of third parties.79 These prudential
requirements are discussed in turn below. The prudential considerations differ
from their constitutional counterparts above only on the basis of their
sources—namely federal jurisprudence and the Constitution, respectively.80 In
application, however, these prudential requirements may be reduced under
certain circumstances, discussed below.81 Regardless of their rigidity, a
proposed change to the standing doctrine naturally gains strength by honoring
these prudential requirements.
The first of these prudential requirements, the zone-of-interests test, also
happens to be the haziest in application. As a rule, the zone-of-interests test
simply requires that a person bringing suit on the basis of statutory
infringement show that he or she is within the zone of interests protected by
the relevant statute.82 The Court articulated this requirement in Ass’n of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,83 noting the need to determine
“whether the interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question,”84 thus expanding the prudential requirement to include cases
brought on constitutional bases. In Data Processing, the plaintiffs originally
brought suit against the Comptroller of Currency and American National Bank
& Trust Company, alleging that the Comptroller’s grant of permission to banks
to engage in data processing services—and American National Bank’s
preparation to do so—violated protections afforded to them by Bank Service

79 Rinehart, supra note 11, at 369 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)). These
requirements have been called into question by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88 (2014). The Supreme Court in Lexmark seems to
have eliminated prudential grounds for denying standing by retroactively labeling earlier decisions on those
bases as actually standing on the constitutional requirement of a justiciable case or controversy. Id. However,
the exact future of prudential requirements is unclear; in any event, the solution outlined in this Comment
avoids their concerns, regardless of their continued existence. For further discussion of Lexmark and prudential
standing requirements, please see infra notes 127–37 and accompanying text.
80 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.4, at 84.
81 See infra Part II.A.2.
82 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.6, at 100.
83 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
84 Id. at 153.
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Corporation Act of 1962.85 In applying the zone-of-interests test, the Court
decided that the limitations in the Bank Service Corporation Act86 implicitly
afforded potential competitors protection from actions that exceed that
permitted realm.87 Thus, protections may be construed even where a statute
neither directly applies to the complaining party nor expressly provides
protections therefor.88
As Data Processing partly illustrates, this zone-of-interests test and its
application have created several concerns and issues. Most prominently, the
doctrine has been applied very inconsistently.89 At times, the Court has applied
the test in a relatively harmless fashion, stating that “[t]he test is not meant to
be especially demanding.”90 In other cases the Court has used the test as the
hammer of federal justiciability to dismiss.91 The general rule in scholarship is
that the zone-of-interests test applies only in cases seeking judicial review of
agency actions.92 However, the Federal Circuit in WARF stated clearly that in
appealing from administrative proceedings these prudential requirements—
including this zone-of-interests test—may be relaxed.93 Accordingly, plaintiffs
are left with a test that seems as likely to depend on the feelings of the

85 Id. at 151, 155. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Comptroller’s action violated National Bank Act in
being outside the scope of its permitted action, but the Court chose not to discuss that particular statute or its
relevance. Id. at 157–58.
86 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1976) (“No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the
performance of bank services for banks.”).
87 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156. The Court goes on to discuss that nothing in the Bank Service
Corporation Act or the National Bank Act precluded judicial review of Comptroller decisions, permitting the
court to hear the case and completing the construction of standing for the plaintiff-petitioners. Id. at 157. For a
presentation of the statutory basis for the judicial review of administrative decisions, see supra note 74.
88 See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155–56.
89 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.6, at 103–05; see also Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l
Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998) (“[O]ur prior cases have not stated a clear rule for determining when a
plaintiff’s interest is ‘arguably within the zone of interests’ to be protected by a statute . . . .”); Clarke v. Sec.
Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 396 (1987) (“The ‘zone of interest’ formula in Data Processing has not proved
self-explanatory . . . .”).
90 Clarke, 497 U.S. at 400; see also Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 522 U.S. at 499 (finding that
“[r]espondent’s interest in limiting the markets that credit unions can serve is ‘arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected’” despite the fact that Congress did not intend for such protections to be afforded
under the statute).
91 See, e.g., Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 530
(1991) (declining to consider the Postal Workers Union to be under the protection of the Private Express
Statutes).
92 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.6, at 105. This belief stems from discussion in Clarke where the
Court refers to the test as a “gloss” on the APA’s discussion of right to judicial review. Clarke, 497 U.S. at 400
n.16.
93 See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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particular judges or justices hearing the case as on any objective
circumstances—along with the knowledge that the test may be left out
altogether.
In addition to the zone-of-interests test, courts also applied the presumption
against generalized grievances as a prudential requirement in evaluating
standing. The specific generalized grievances to which this doctrine refers are
those in which the harm allegedly suffered is incurred simply in the course of
being a concerned citizen and taxpayer.94 This requirement, among others,
prevents any concerned citizen from bringing suit against a patent holder
whose patent the citizen considers invalid or unethical.95 However, the doctrine
does not preclude citizens from bringing suit simply because an injury is
suffered by many in the course of citizenship; for instance, constitutional
claims alleging government infringement of the litigant’s specific
constitutional rights are not subject to the presumption against generalized
grievances.96 Instead, the doctrine seeks to exclude the citizen who, alleging no
injury to a specific constitutional right, “claims an interest only as a taxpayer
or a citizen in having the government follow the law.”97
While the remedy proposed in this Comment avoids the
generalized-grievance concern altogether, the policy underlying its application
must be examined to ensure that, while there are no mechanical inconsistencies
in a new system, no doctrinal inconsistencies exist either. The Supreme Court’s
stance on this subject has evolved over time, and as a result the issue has been
the subject of a fair amount of discussion. Early cases on the subject denied
standing for claims which were deemed “comparatively minute and
indeterminable”98 or “merely [of] a general interest common to all members of

94 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.5, at 91. Interestingly, Chemerinsky views the decision in Lujan
as positing that this requirement is actually constitutional rather than prudential. Id. at 91 n.163. Contra Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is, nonetheless, clear that [such] plaintiffs . . .
are not constitutionally excluded from the federal courts. The problem . . . is . . . to determine in what
circumstances, consonant with the character and proper functioning of the federal courts, such suits should be
permitted.”).
95 See Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1263 (refusing to recognize standing where “Consumer
Watchdog only ha[d] a general grievance against the ‘913 patent”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.5,
at 91.
96 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.5, at 91–92.
97 Id.
98 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (denying standing to a citizen alleging harm as a
result of a Maternity Act despite being a US citizen and taxpayer).
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the public.”99 The Court in Frothingham v. Mellon cited the “remote,
fluctuating and uncertain” likelihood of harm to come from future government
expenditure,100 but the Court’s concern seems to be essentially one of
numbers.101 After all, providing legal recourse in federal court for trivial injury
suffered by millions of citizens would crush the efficacy of the court system.102
The Supreme Court’s decision in Flast v. Cohen represented a departure
from this doctrine. In Flast, the plaintiff was granted standing as a taxpayer
alleging that appropriations for purchase of textbooks and school supplies for
parochial schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.103 In revisiting the presumption against generalized grievances,
the Court established a two-part nexus, which must be shown for cases that
find their foundational injury in a citizen’s status as a taxpayer: “First, the
taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of
legislative enactment attacked. . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a
nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged.”104 The first requirement essentially dictates that the
harm must have occurred through a congressional action taken pursuant to “the
taxing and spending clause of Art. 1, § 8, of the Constitution.”105 Then, the
second requirement establishes that a plaintiff must indicate an exact
constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power which has been
exceeded by the action; merely showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutionally delegated powers would not be adequate for standing.106 This
second component distinguished Flast from Frothingham in the eyes of the
Court because the Tenth Amendment is not a limitation on congressional
spending in the same sense as the First Amendment is.107 While its holding
was narrow, Flast’s greatest significance is found simply in its willingness to
consider certain generalized harms as conferring standing.

99 Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (denying standing claimed on the basis of injury stemming
from citizenship and from membership in the state bar).
100 262 U.S. at 487.
101 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 83 (1968) (noting that the plaintiff in Frothingham was denied standing
“not because she was a taxpayer but because her tax bill was not large enough. . . . [E]ntertaining that
taxpayer’s suit . . . might [have] open[ed] the door of federal courts to countless such suits”).
102 For a discussion of preventing the overrun of federal courts as a central policy in the standing doctrine,
see infra note 209 and accompanying text.
103 Flast, 392 U.S. at 87–88.
104 Id. at 102.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 102–03.
107 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.5, at 94.
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Flast ultimately created only a small exception to an otherwise steadfast
rule, not a window for other allowances to be made. Through a series of
subsequent decisions108 the Supreme Court ultimately isolated one type of
circumstance as a cognizable exception to the rule against generalized
grievances: situations in which the government’s use of its spending power is
alleged to have violated the Establishment Clause.109 As discussed below, part
of the motivation behind this restrictive view certainly aims to avoid crushing
the courts with innumerable inconsequential cases.110 However, this policy also
found part of its basis in separation of powers concerns. In Frothingham, the
Court noted that the presumption against generalized grievances prevents
judicial overreach.111 In Flast, the Court recognized that Article III “define[s]
the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure
that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government,” with justiciability existing as a check on any such
potential intrusion.112 In United States v. Richardson, the Court pointed to the
democratic nature of the U.S. government as the mechanism by which the
accountability sought could be obtained, implying that asking the Court to
police the rest of the government exceeded its mandate.113 In all of these cases,
these concerns arise as reasons to observe limitations on standing, particularly
in the realm of generalized grievances.114 As a result, the underlying policy

108

See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464
(1982) (denying standing despite an Establishment Clause claim given that the action contested was an
exercise of the use of government property, not an exercise of the spending power); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (denying standing for plaintiff seeking CIA expenditure list as not being an
action under the spending power); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)
(denying standing to plaintiff challenging Executive Branch action for not challenging a spending-power
action under Article I, Section 8).
109 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.5, at 96.
110 See infra Part II.A.4, note 209 and accompanying text.
111 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488–89 (1923) (“[Adjudicating generalized grievances] would
be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly [courts] do not possess.”).
112 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
113 418 U.S. at 179 (“Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair
the right to assert [one’s] views in the political forum or at the polls.”).
114 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 474
(1982) (“Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure requires neither that the Judicial
Branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it
hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where
the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury.”); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 222 (1974) (“To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to require a court to rule on important
constitutional issues in the abstract would create the potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort the role
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implications of this prudential rule are twofold: the practical concern for the
efficacy of the courts and the principled concern over separation of powers.
While this particular requirement—that grievances not be generalized—may
not arise in the scheme proposed by this Comment, any new system should
honor these underlying policies to withstand the scrutiny both of lawmakers
and eventually of the judiciary.
After considering the presumption against generalized grievances, courts
then applied the limitation on third-party standing, the third prudential
consideration in making standing determinations. The Supreme Court
recognized this limitation in Warth v. Seldin by stating that “even when the
plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or controversy’
requirement, this Court has held that the plaintiff generally must assert his own
legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights
or interests of third parties.”115 This rule serves two purposes: first, it prevents
third parties from litigating issues which the persons of primary interest have
no interest in litigating; and second, it leads to higher quality litigation and
adjudication by involving primarily concerned parties.116
Despite its appearance as a bright-line rule, three major exceptions have
been promulgated in response to this prudential consideration. Two of these
exceptions have little bearing on the problem at hand. The first involves
situations in which there exists a close relationship between the plaintiff and
the third party,117 and the second deals with the overbreadth doctrine, which
“permits a person to challenge a statute on the ground that it violates the First
Amendment rights of third parties not before the court, even though the law is
constitutional as applied to that defendant.”118 For reasons apparent, neither of
these exceptions is particularly relevant to the expansion of standing in patent
litigation as proposed in this Comment.
The third exception, however, is of great importance to this Comment and
arises when a third party whose interests are represented is likely unable to sue.

of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable
charge of providing ‘government by injunction.’”).
115 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
116 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.4, at 84.
117 Id. at 86; see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (granting standing to teachers of a
private school to represent the rights of their students).
118 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.4, at 89–90; see also Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson
Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (granting standing to a fundraiser to represent the interests of charities,
including the Fraternal Order of Police, in protecting freedom-of-speech rights).
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In such a circumstance, this exception simply states that “there are situations
where competing considerations outweigh any prudential rationale against
third-party standing . . . [w]here practical obstacles prevent a party from
asserting rights on behalf of itself.”119 In such circumstances, the third party
representing another’s interests must demonstrate both “a sufficient injury-infact to satisfy the Art. III case-or-controversy requirement”120 and the ability
“to frame the issues and present them with the necessary adversarial zeal.”121
As a result, cases in which courts have been willing to find standing under
this exception are typically those involving perceived social justice issues,
issues that easily lend themselves to “adversarial zeal.” For instance, the
defendant in Barrows v. Jackson championed the cause of black citizens whose
rights were being violated by state application of damages for breach of
racially biased housing contracts.122 In that case, the defendant, a white
property owner in Los Angeles, was sued for breach of contract when she
allowed “non-Caucasians” to move into the premises, the original sale of
which was contingent on a contract agreeing that “no part of [her] said real
property . . . should ever at any time be used or occupied by any person . . . not
wholly of the white or Caucasian race.”123 In being sued for breach of contract,
the property owner had incurred the required injury in fact.124 The Court then
recognized that in certain cases “the reasons which underlie [the] rule denying
standing to raise another’s rights . . . are outweighed by the need to protect the
fundamental rights which would be denied by permitting the damages action to
be maintained,” namely in circumstances where “it would be difficult if not
impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance
before any court.”125
While meritorious and commendable, this exception—and indeed the
prudential rule itself—may not necessarily come into play when considering
the viability of the patent-law standing expansion proposed in this Comment.
Regardless, the exception represents an important principle which is critical to
119

Sec’y of State of Md., 467 U.S. at 956.
Id. As discussed below, the injury-in-fact requirement persists even when other constitutional and
prudential requirements may be waived. See infra note 143.
121 Sec’y of State of Md., 467 U.S. at 956.
122 See 346 U.S. 249, 251–52 (1953).
123 Id. at 251.
124 Id. at 255–56 (“This principle [denying standing unless injury has been suffered] has no application to
the instant case in which the respondent has been sued for damages . . . and in which a judgment against [her]
would constitute a direct pocketbook injury.”).
125 Id. at 257.
120
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the viability of this proposed expansion to patent law standing. Specifically,
this doctrine demonstrates that, upon suffering a cognizable injury, a plaintiff
could argue a case on the basis of third-party rights and concerns.126 This
permission, along with avenues for avoiding certain requirements of standing
discussed below, would have provided the basis for this Comment’s proposal
even prior to the Supreme Court’s pivotal ruling in Lexmark.
In 2014, in a landmark decision in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., the Supreme Court largely eliminated the notion of
prudential standing requirements.127 In Lexmark, Static Control developed a
technology that would allow third parties “to refurbish and resell Lexmark
cartridges.”128 Lexmark, naturally upset, brought suit against Static Control
alleging copyright infringement.129 Static Control, in turn, filed a counterclaim
against the printing giant for, among other things, false advertising under the
Lanham Act.130 The factual bases for its claim, according to Static Control,
were misrepresentations to both consumers and manufacturers that the law
essentially protected every aspect of Lexmark’s control of the printer cartridge
life-cycle.131 The district court dismissed Static Control’s counterclaim because
it lacked “prudential standing,” relying on the prudential requirements outlined
above.132 The Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court “granted
certiorari to decide the appropriate analytical framework for determining a
party’s standing to maintain an action for false advertising under the Lanham
Act.”133 At issue was whether Static Control, as neither a consumer nor a
manufacturer of printer cartridges, fell under the zone of interests of the
Lanham Act.134
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, stated, “Just as a court
cannot apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action
that Congress has denied, it cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has
created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates.”135 In so deciding, the Court
corrected course on prior jurisprudence by noting that the zone-of-interests
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014).
Id. at 1384.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1385 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1388 (citation omitted).
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requirement is merely a matter of statutory interpretation, rather than an
application of a prudential standing requirement.136 The Court seems to say
that the balance of the prudential requirements—outside of the
zone-of-interests requirement, which, as just established, is actually statutory—
cannot allow a Court to deny standing in a case.137 Thus, it may be that the
prudential requirements traditionally observed in the federal standing doctrine
no longer hold sway. Regardless, to the extent that a proposed expansion of
standing can placate the objections of any legal scholars clinging to those
requirements, those requirements may still be evaluated.
2. Relaxation of Constitutional and Prudential Standing Requirements
In some situations, the constitutional and, to the extent they may have
survived Lexmark, prudential requirements of standing may be
circumvented.138 Specifically, “Congress may enact statutes creating legal
rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”139 More critically for the
purposes of this Comment, Congress may also afford procedural rights that
reduce the requirements of standing, eliminating the need for immediacy and
redressability.140 As a particularly relevant example, procedural rights to
appeal administrative decisions lead to such a relaxation of standing’s
requirements.141 The system proposed herein takes advantage of this feature by
transitively challenging the validity of patents through appeal from the PTO
pursuant to the right to agency review under the AIA.142

136 Id. at 1387 (“Whether a plaintiff comes within ‘the “zone of interests”’ is an issue that requires us to
determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action
encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”).
137 Id. at 1388 (“We do not ask whether in our judgment Congress should have authorized Static Control’s
suit, but whether Congress in fact did so.”).
138 Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[W]here Congress has accorded a procedural right . . . certain requirements of standing—namely immediacy
and redressability, as well as prudential aspects that are not part of Article III—may be relaxed.” (citing
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007))).
139 Id. at 1262 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)).
140 Id. at 1261–62 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007)).
141 Id.
142 See infra text accompanying notes 238–39.

BLEVINS GALLEYSPROOFS2

916

2/25/2016 10:08 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:893

3. Injury in Fact as the Cornerstone of Standing
Despite the ability to procedurally circumvent some of the requirements of
standing, injury in fact must always be present.143 As a result, the injury-in-fact
requirement merits an in-depth discussion unto itself. After all, injury in fact,
given relaxation of standing under procedural rights, presents the greatest
hurdle in appealing administrative decisions, such as those made by the PTO in
inter partes reexaminations.144
In approaching this injury-in-fact hurdle, two main concerns arise: whether
an injury has been personally suffered, and whether that injury is sufficient to
establish standing.145 The former aspect has much more bearing on the issue of
interest groups bringing suit and, as a result, seems to have a fair amount of
interplay with the prudential requirement barring third-party suits discussed
above.146 Two cases from the 1970s, Sierra Club v. Morton147 and United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure (SCRAP),148
illustrate the personal injury requirement aptly.149
Sierra Club purports to address the issue “as to what must be alleged by
persons who claim injury of a noneconomic nature to interests that are widely
shared.”150 For this Comment, though, this case also presents a helpful
illustration of the distinction between bases for standing and bases for
argument in court once standing is conferred. In Sierra Club, Walt Disney
Enterprises outlined a plan to develop the Mineral King Valley area in the
Sierra Nevada Mountains under a permit from the U.S. Forest Service.151 The
Sierra Club, self-described today as “the nation’s largest and most influential
grassroots environmental organization,”152 sought to preserve the area by

143 Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d at 1262 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 505,
578 (1992)); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) (“[T]he requirement of injury in
fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (stating that the Court previously decided “persons had standing to obtain judicial
review of federal agency action under § 10 of the APA where they had alleged that the challenged action had
caused them ‘injury in fact’”).
144 See supra Part I.
145 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.2, at 62.
146 See supra text accompanying notes 115–25 (discussing the limitation on third-party standing).
147 405 U.S. 727.
148 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
149 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.2, at 62–63.
150 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734.
151 Id. at 729.
152 About Us, SIERRA CLUB, www.sierraclub.org/about (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
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seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Forest Service
from issuing the development permits.153 In its complaint, Sierra Club “alleged
that the development ‘would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the scenery,
natural and historic objects and wildlife in the park and would impair the
enjoyment of the park for future generations.’”154
The Supreme Court held that Sierra Club lacked standing for the suit,155
noting that “Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be
affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the Disney development.”156
Sierra Club relied on the APA157 to challenge the impending agency action, but
in its complaint the Club did not address the issue of personal injury.158
Instead, the Club claimed that its “longstanding concern with and expertise in
such matters were sufficient to give it standing as a ‘representative of the
public.’”159
The Court rejected this notion that a party could represent the interests of a
generally aggrieved public, calling it a misinterpretation of case law.160 More
specifically, the Court believed the contention to be a misinterpretation161 of
Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC162 and FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station.163
The Court further clarified the doctrine by establishing that “the fact of
economic injury is what gives a person standing to seek judicial review under
the statute, but once review is properly invoked, that person may argue the
public interest in support of his claim that the agency has failed to comply with
its statutory mandate.”164

153

Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 730.
Id. at 734.
155 Id. at 741.
156 Id. at 735.
157 See supra note 35.
158 See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 736.
159 Id. (citing Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (1970)).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 736–38.
162 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
163 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
164 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 737. But see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedure (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (“[W]e made it clear that standing was not confined to those
who could show ‘economic harm . . . .’”). While the Court in Sierra Club ultimately affirmed the dismissal of
the case for lack of standing, this statement represents much more than dicta. It serves as recognition of
previously existing law based on its assertion that “Sanders and Scripps-Howard thus established [this] dual
proposition.” Accordingly, while the statement itself is dicta, the rule is established law from the two cases.
See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 737.
154
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Through this discussion, Sierra Club aptly illustrates several important
elements of the injury-in-fact requirement and its place in this Comment. First,
the decision emphasizes that an aggrieved party must be able to show personal
injury despite any specialized or concentrated interest in the subject of
litigation.165 This requirement persists despite the fact that “[o]ften the very
best adversaries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the
American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract
question at issue in the case, but no concrete injury of fact whatever.”166
Second, if standing may be first established through such a showing, public
interest may be considered and argued in the course of litigation.167 Thus,
injury in fact is required to open the gate to litigation but not to pave the road
beyond; from there, public interest arguments may make up the avenue along
which a party seeks relief. These points suggest that, as long as the mechanism
here presents an injury in fact, the case may subsequently be argued on the
issue of patent validity based on public interest.
The Court’s decision in SCRAP168 provides a relatively immediate and
contrasting application of its decision in Sierra Club, establishing another
important ideological building block for the standing this Comment creates. In
SCRAP, a group of law students brought suit against the United States and the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), seeking an injunction to prevent
enforcement of ICC orders allowing railroads to collect an additional
surcharge.169 In its complaint, SCRAP alleged the following harms had been
suffered by its members: “each of its members was caused to pay more for
finished products”; each used the outdoor and natural areas in and around
Washington, D.C., for “recreational [and] aesthetic purposes,” purposes which
had been harmed by the increase in freight rates; each breathed the air in the
D.C. area, air which has suffered additional pollution as a result of the
modified rate structure; and each had suffered additional taxes as a result of the
rate increase.170 In alleging this relatively general but personal harm, SCRAP
distinguished its case from that in Sierra Club by pointing out that its members

165

See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 891 (1983).
167 See supra text accompanying note 164.
168 SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669.
169 Id. at 678.
170 Id. (alteration in original).
166
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had actually availed themselves of the natural resources they sought to
protect.171
The Court agreed with SCRAP’s characterization, noting that in SCRAP,
“by contrast, the appellees claimed that the specific and allegedly illegal action
of the Commission would directly harm them in their use of the natural
resources of the Washington Metropolitan Area.”172 This agreement came with
the acknowledgment that the interest in SCRAP was geographically far broader
than that in Sierra Club, in that “all persons who utilize the scenic resources of
the country . . . [or] breathe its air[] could claim harm similar to that
alleged . . . here.”173 In recognizing this difference, the Court established that
“standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same
injury.”174 Even further, the Court emphasized that such a policy “would mean
that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be
questioned by nobody.”175 For the purposes of this Comment, then, the fact
that interest in patents is common to the U.S. public does not create a
substantial policy concern in expanding standing to contest patent validity.176
Together, these two cases reveal the indispensable nature of the need for
personally suffered injury. Both cases involved public interest groups bringing
suit to protect the environment, but only SCRAP alleged a personally suffered
injury to establish standing.177 Further, the fact that the public interest might
make up the majority of the argument following the allegation of harm made
no difference to the Court in SCRAP; the Court merely required that some
harm be alleged to establish standing first.178 However, while these cases
illustrate the requirement of personally suffered injury, a different standard

171

Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 687.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 688.
176 As a reminder, though, this concern is only implicated as a matter of policy; this Comment’s proposal
avoids the issue by creating a specific cognizable harm for the organizations bringing the suit, though the
interest in the patent litigation on behalf of the public is shared by many. See infra Part III.A.
177 Compare SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687 (“[H]ere, . . . appellees claimed that the specific and allegedly
illegal action of the Commission would directly harm them in their use of the natural resources.”), with Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (“The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be
affected . . . by the Disney development.”).
178 See supra notes 172–75; see also SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14 (“[A]n identifiable trifle is enough for
standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the
motivation.” (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613
(1968))).
172
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exists for parties seeking declaratory or injunctive relief in anticipation of a
supposedly impending harm.179 The public interest organizations’ ultimate
goals in litigating through the proposed system will likely be declaratory
judgments against the patents they attack, so the standards specific to equitable
relief bear discussion.
Unlike those seeking legal remedies, plaintiffs seeking declaratory or
injunctive relief180 must demonstrate likelihood of future injury as a result of
the challenged action.181 The Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
established the differing standing requirements for cases in which plaintiffs
seek equitable relief.182 In Lyons, Los Angeles police had subjected the
plaintiff to a controlling choke-hold following a traffic stop.183 Lyons then
sought, in addition to damages, “injunctive relief . . . against the use of control
holds” except in special, threatening circumstances.184 However, the Court
ultimately dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, stating that “Lyons’
standing to seek the injunction requested depended on whether he was likely to
suffer future injury from the use of chokeholds by police officers.”185
In order for Lyons to have established that requisite likelihood, the Court
suggested that he would have to allege not only another encounter with police
but also that “all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with
whom they happen to have an encounter . . . [or] that the City ordered or
authorized [them] to act in such a manner.”186 Given that neither of these
preposterous allegations was present, the Court dismissed,187 but not before
making a particularly interesting comment in dicta, noting that the legality of
179

See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
Equitable remedies are frequently sought in patent litigation, so much of the discussion in those cases
deal with this standard. As a result, the doctrine bears presentation here. Its application to patent challenges
seeking declaratory judgment is discussed in supra Part I.A.
181 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (“[S]tanding to seek the injunction
requested depended on whether [plaintiff] was likely to suffer future injury . . . .”).
182 461 U.S. at 111. A similar differentiation in standing requirements on the basis of the remedy sought
was previously discussed in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974), but the Court there dismissed for
lack of an alleged personally suffered injury. Id. at 495 (“None of the named plaintiffs is identified as himself
having suffered any injury in the manner specified.”). Thus the discussion regarding equitable relief there was
purely dicta. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372–73, 380 (1976) (mentioning differing standards for
equitable relief but citing non-identification of defendants as perpetrators and federalism principles in
dismissing for lack of standing).
183 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97.
184 Id. at 98.
185 Id. at 105.
186 Id. at 106.
187 Id. at 110.
180
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challenged actions are equally challengeable under an action for damages as
under an action seeking injunctive relief.188 In other words, activity which is
not necessarily challengeable in seeking equitable remedy may be challenged
through seeking damages and, in the course of adjudication, be determined
illegal, practically enjoining the party from continuing the practice.
Regardless, Lyons established that a complaining party must allege a
certain likelihood of future harm to have standing in seeking injunctive
relief.189 Since the decision, though, the Court has applied Lyons in cases in
which plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment as well.190 As a result, in addition
to establishing the personal nature of the alleged harm, plaintiffs seeking any
form of equitable relief must currently allege the continuing likelihood of that
harm. Thus, were the system proposed herein to rely on suits directly seeking
declaratory judgment, plaintiffs would have to show—and indeed they must
show currently—a likelihood of harm flowing from the assertion of a patent’s
claims in order to challenge the validity thereof.191
Having established a personally suffered harm, however, the question still
remains as to what injury is sufficient to establish standing. No clear
delineation exists as to what exactly constitutes adequate injury, but courts
have acknowledged that infringements on common-law, constitutional, or
statutory rights all provide injury adequate to establish standing.192 Further,
certain other injuries may confer standing, but those injuries are decided on an
injury-by-injury basis, and no clear rules seem to distinguish those injuries the
courts consider adequate.193
Historically, injuries to common-law rights comprised the entirety of the
field of standing-granting injury.194 In early jurisprudence, the Court explained
that no standing was granted “unless the right invaded [was] a legal right[]—
one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.”195 The

188 Id. at 111 (“The legality of the violence to which Lyons claims he was once subjected is at issue in his
suit for damages and can be determined there.”).
189 Id. at 106.
190 See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47–50 (1991) (seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief for practice of delaying probable cause hearings over holiday weekends).
191 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
192 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.2, at 69.
193 Id. at 75.
194 Id. at 69.
195 Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137–38 (1939).
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plaintiffs in Tennessee Electric tried to claim a right to protection from
competition as a manifestation of a right to protect their property, franchises,
“from injury or destruction by competition.”196 Given that “competition
between natural persons is lawful,” no such right was deemed to exist at
common law, so no standing was conferred on the plaintiffs for the suit.197
Injury to statutory and constitutional rights can further establish
standing,198 but given that the harm proposed in the solution below is strictly
economic, a discussion of injury to statutory and constitutional rights is not
presently necessary.
4. Policy Underlying Federal Standing
To promote viability, any argument to expand a doctrine should take into
consideration the policy underlying the doctrine and its application. In the case
of standing in federal court, the doctrine arguably serves several purposes in
limiting access to those courts. First, standing maintains the ideological pillar
of separation of powers.199 Justice Scalia describes standing as protecting
legislation from “wanton assaults”200 by the general, not-particularly-aggrieved
public, thus protecting the extent to which judges and justices may subvert the
democratic process of lawmaking with the undemocratic process of
adjudication.201 To the extent that cases challenge legislation, Justice Scalia
views the courts as protecting the interests of individuals and minorities,
through undemocratic adjudication, from democratic—and thus inherently
majoritarian—legislation.202 Under this theory, then, to expand or neglect the
doctrine of standing would be to allow the courts to determine these issues not
just for minorities but also for the majority as a whole, a task for which the
unelected judiciary is ill-suited.203 In short, standing “excludes [courts] from
196

Id. at 138.
Id. Plaintiffs also tried in vain to invoke statutory rights and constitutional rights which supposedly
protected them from competition, but no such rights were found to exist. Id. at 137–38 (“In no aspect of the
case have the appellants standing to maintain the suit.”). Thus no discussion as to the adequacy of infringement
on constitutional rights to create standing is given in this case.
198 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.2, at 69.
199 Id. § 2.3.1, at 58.
200 Scalia, supra note 166, at 892 (quoting A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 102 (T.
Bradley ed. 1945) (1835)).
201 Id. at 892–93.
202 Id. at 894.
203 Id. at 894, 896 (stating that judges are “selected from the aristocracy of the highly educated, instructed
to be governed by a body of knowledge that values abstract principle above concrete result,” and “removed
from all accountability to the electorate”).
197
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the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches
should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself.”204 These
separation-of-powers concerns escalate further when the case at hand calls into
question the constitutionality of an action made by the Executive or Legislative
Branches of the federal government.205 Simultaneously, though, this concern
supports the need for judicial review as much as it seeks to limit it.206 After all,
judicial review keeps executive and legislative powers in check in the same
sense that the doctrine of standing limits judicial power by restricting the scope
of federal justiciability.207
Second, standing protects the federal court system in multiple ways. As a
practical matter the doctrine keeps the courts from being overwhelmed with
trivial cases—trivial because there is neither a cognizable harm nor an
available redress.208 Otherwise, courts may be flooded with cases in which
plaintiffs seek relief on principle rather than on the basis of harm.209 That said,
Chemerinsky expresses skepticism towards this concern, pointing to the high
cost of litigation as a potentially adequately controlling factor in limiting suits
even in the absence of standing.210 As a political shield, standing protects the
federal courts from polarizing its relationships with other branches of the
federal government by making it more difficult for the courts to tackle
politically charged issues.211 Should the judiciary take up political banners, the
Legislative and Executive Branches may take steps to reduce the power of the
judiciary to stamp out certain political stances.212 However, political matters
are inevitably addressed by the courts;213 where the other branches of
government disagree with the policy ramifications of judicial decisions, they

204

Id. at 894.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.1, at 58 (stating that “the ‘standing inquiry is especially rigorous
[because of separation of powers concerns] when reaching the merits of a dispute would force [it] to decide
whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the federal government was unconstitutional’”
(quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997))).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 59.
209 Id.
210 Id. (“But in light of the high costs of litigation, one must wonder how large the burden really would be
without the current standing restrictions.”).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (religious objection to Affordable
Care Act); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
205
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may take—and indeed have taken214—steps to redirect the ship of policy
without removing the judicial sails for having simply addressed the wind.
More concretely, the legislature specifically may always enact law to
counteract judicial decisions as it sees fit without resorting to a limitation on or
reduction in judicial power.215
Third, standing supposedly improves judicial decision-making in two ways:
first, by presenting specific conflicts to which courts may apply applicable law,
and second, by ensuring the issue has an effective litigant by requiring specific
injury in fact.216 Problems exist with both of these defenses, though. For
instance, some cases end up being adjudicated focusing on policy implications
and stare decisis rather than on the injury at hand, so the need for a specific
conflict may vary.217 Further, applying the doctrine of standing does not
guarantee that a case will have an effective litigant. As Chemerinsky
illustrates, “The best litigator in the country who cared deeply about an issue
could not raise it without a plaintiff with standing; but a pro se litigant, with no
legal training, could pursue the matter on his or her own behalf.”218
Fourth, and finally, standing purports to protect fairness by preventing
“intermeddl[ing]” litigation.219 Courts, though, may end up turning away a
genuinely aggrieved party because that party cannot show injury in fact as
required by this doctrine,220 a stance which hardly deserves the label of
fairness. Ultimately, each of the justifications for the doctrine of standing fails
to align perfectly with the practical application of the doctrine, particularly in
the landscape of patent cases where the notion of injury has received an even
narrower interpretation in practice, as discussed above. Still, any solution
which can fulfill the technical requirements of standing while honoring its
underlying policies likely promises adoptive success. The solution proposed

214 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution was a reaction to
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), and it granted states immunity from suit by non-citizens. See Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
215 See id.
216 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.3.1, at 59. While Chemerinsky points to the factors discussed in
notes 217–18, below, as reasons these policies may not be well served in actuality, the skepticism expressed in
this statement is my own.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 60.
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herein attempts to accomplish both of these tasks in addressing a noted
shortcoming in the standing doctrine in patent cases.221
B. Administrative Law and Rulemaking Authority of the PTO
An administrative incapacity on the part of the PTO to promulgate the
necessary rule would nullify any doctrinal viability of a proposed solution to
this problem. Indeed, the PTO lacks much of the substantive rulemaking
authority of other administrative agencies.222 The Federal Circuit has
recognized that the “broadest” of the PTO’s powers is the ability to “establish
regulations, not inconsistent with the law,” which “govern the proceedings of
the Office.”223 Thus, while the PTO lacks the ability to affect substantive
law,224 it does possess the power to promulgate rules relating to its own
internal function.225 For instance, this internal function includes “authority over
PTO practice, including interference proceedings.”226 Thus, choosing
organizations to which the PTO can offer membership in the scheme
constructed in this Comment likely falls within the PTO’s rulemaking
capabilities. Part III, below, outlines the proposal in detail.
III. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE LAW
This Comment puts forth a solution for extending standing in patent
litigation to public interest organizations. This Part outlines how the PTO—in
conjunction with some cooperation from the courts—may transitively extend
standing to those organizations. This extension flows from offering a small
number of organizations the chance to participate in a program whereby they
pay a monetary forfeit on losing a reexamination at the PTO. That monetary
expense would constitute an injury in fact to confer standing on these
organizations to then litigate the underlying issue of patent validity in federal
court. After presenting the solution in detail, this Part considers the
implications of the solution with respect to the federal standing doctrine and
the underlying principles of patent law.

221
222
223
224
225
226

See infra Part III.B.1.
See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2012).
Stevens v. Tamai, 366 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2000)).
See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2).
See id.
Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1527 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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A. Enabling the PTO to Endow Organizations with Standing
The PTO, federal courts, and public interest organizations should take the
following steps in order to expand standing in patent litigation to greater
include the public voice. First, the PTO should promulgate a rule allowing
itself to recognize certain public interest organizations for a special system
involving inter partes reexaminations. More specifically, the PTO should
enable itself to extend offers of participation in a scheme in which public
interest organizations must pay a monetary penalty upon losing an inter partes
reexamination.227 The exact dollar amount of the forfeit is not critical, but
avoiding extremes would be advisable. An exceptionally small dollar amount
may become nominal to the point that it fails to create standing and fails to
deter frivolous challenges, thereby harming the viability of this mechanism. On
the other hand, an exceptionally large dollar amount may dissuade any public
interest organizations from participating, but a moderate degree of expense
may assist in winnowing which organizations merit recognition in order to
keep the number appropriately small.
Second, the PTO must structure the rule such that it maintains discretion
over the organizations to which it extends offers of participation, with
guidelines included as to the sorts of organizations which merit recognition.
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the successor to the BPAI under
the America Invents Act (AIA),228 is one logical candidate for making
decisions relating to such offers; it has a vested interest in maintaining its own
administrative efficiency, and it is rather uniquely positioned to understand
which organizations may be most effective in challenging patents.
Alternatively, the patent office may choose to create a new committee
(Committee) to oversee this program. The Committee option would allow the
BPAI to maintain its current responsibilities in hearing inter partes
reexaminations while allowing the Committee itself to develop organizational
expertise on public interest in patent litigation. In any event, this element of the
rule will allow the PTO to keep the number of participating organizations to an
optimal minimum.
Specifically, the controlling parameters relating to this membership and its
optimal minimum serve the purposes of both standing—by limiting access to
227 Third parties may also challenge an issued patent’s validity through post-grant review and covered
business method procedures under the AIA. See 35 U.S.C. § 321; 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.300–42.304 (2014).
However, this solution focuses on inter partes review.
228 See supra note 7.
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federal courts—and patent law—by avoiding substantial harm on the patent
system from overexposure. First, the membership should set a low maximum
number of organizations, likely on the order of ten public interest groups. This
small number not only serves the policies described above but also encourages
either the BPAI or the Committee to choose organizations that would cover as
much of the diverse American society as possible.
A small membership established, that membership should come with
certain requirements, the applications of which are left to the discretion of
either the BPAI or the Committee. The following elements of organizations are
suggested as potential criteria for these determinations: covering a wide swath
of public interest; maintaining a diverse membership or target group;
representing the public beyond its membership; and possessing the logistical
wherewithal to adequately represent its interests effectively in litigation. The
astute application of these criteria will ensure that participating organizations
will make use of their privileges. Finally, membership should be limited to
one- or two-year terms, after which all interested organizations submit
petitions for consideration either to the BPAI or the Committee on the basis of
the above criteria. The cycling of organizations prevents institutional capture
and undue influence while encouraging diversity and a more comprehensive
representation of the public interest.
Third, courts must recognize that the monetary injury suffered upon losing
an inter partes reexamination confers adequate standing to appeal the ruling of
the PTO in federal court. This situation contrasts sharply with that of
Consumer Watchdog in WARF. There, Consumer Watchdog “relie[d] on the
Board’s denial of [its] requested administrative action” in trying to establish an
injury for purposes of the standing doctrine.229 The Federal Circuit noted in its
opinion that the ruling “did not invade any legal right conferred upon
Consumer Watchdog.”230 In contrast, under the new system proposed herein,
the ruling will have visited economic harm on the participating organization,
creating an injury in fact which the court must recognize for purposes of
standing in an appeal from an administrative ruling.
Fourth, the system must incorporate a potential punishment or expulsion
mechanism for organizations which do not conduct themselves in such a way
as to encourage the feasibility of the system. More specifically, the mechanism

229
230

Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1262.
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should encourage a participating organization to be selective and judicious in
the cases it chooses to pursue. Periodic review of the organization’s activity in
the new system should be conducted by the BPAI, whereby consistent
frivolous over-activity within the Patent Office or in federal court may render
the organization subject to expulsion from the system based on the discretion
of the BPAI. Further, violations of the PTO ethical rules231 could be made to
automatically trigger either reprimand or expulsion. That said, if the PTO
chooses to create the Committee mentioned above solely for the purpose of
administering this system, the policing responsibilities may appropriately fall
to that Committee.
Regardless of the exact organizational structure, this system creates
standing for public interest organizations while operating within
congressionally defined limits. Further, the system is narrowly constructed
such that its impact will be limited exactly to the issue it is designed to address.
These two features distinguish this proposed solution from others in the past
and make it particularly, immediately, and uniquely viable.232 Most notably,
Professor Rinehart has suggested that Congress should pass a statute
expanding standing for cases brought by any member of the public alleging
“an injury relating to a restraint on his [or her] trade or to his [or her] health or
safety.”233 However, this statute likely opens the door for a flood of all kinds of
civil cases in federal court by any member of the public, and it relies on the
political viability of the idea by requiring congressional action to enact it. The
solution described here contrasts sharply with that proposed by Professor
Rinehart: suits will come as appeals pursuant to the AIA as an appeal from an
administrative agency,234 not actions pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments
Act;235 “persons” with standing will be limited to a select few public interest
organizations; and the solution requires no congressional action. Most
importantly, this system finally addresses a glaring and hypocritical236 hole in
the standing doctrine as it relates to patent law and acknowledges the growing
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See USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct, 37 C.F.R. § 11.101 (2014).
Cf. Rinehart, supra note 11, at 400 (suggesting congressional expansion of standing for cases
challenging patents under the Declaratory Judgments Act to recognize restraint on trade or injury to health or
safety as conferring standing in patent litigation).
233 Id.
234 See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012).
235 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
236 This language refers to the exclusion of the public from federal court in cases relating directly to the
public’s endorsement of technological innovations. See supra Part I.B.
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trend toward public interest in patents and the federal standing relating to their
adjudication.
B. Compatibility of the Proposal with Federal Standing and Patent Law
The solution described above ought to align not only with the mechanical
considerations of the federal standing doctrine but also with the policy
underlying standing and patent law. This section explores that compatibility. It
first demonstrates that the solution honors all of the concerns inherent in the
federal standing doctrine. Then, it confirms that the policy underlying patent
law supports the adoption of this solution.
1. Observing Standing Requirements and Standing Policy
The solution described in Part III.A takes into consideration each of the
principles and concerns underlying the federal standing doctrine. As a
manifestation of this alignment, the standing conferred by the proposed system
likely meets each aspect of the constitutional requirements for standing
described in Lujan.237 This observation comes despite the fact that, in relating
only to appeals from administrative rulings, the solution need only meet the
baseline injury-in-fact requirement.238 Regardless, the injury-in-fact
requirement is certainly fulfilled in the circumstance created in this solution:
the public interest organization will have personally suffered a monetary injury
as a result of the BPAI’s ruling, and that injury is sufficient to confer
standing.239
The proposed system also honors the prudential considerations inherent in
the standing doctrine, once again in spite of the fact that such prudential
considerations have likely been eliminated by Lexmark and may be avoided
anyway in administrative appeals. In particular, the zone-of-interests
requirement is likely inapplicable because any case brought through the
mechanism of this solution would not relate to the infringement of an express
“statut[ory] or constitutional guarantee.”240 The presumption against
generalized grievances241 does not create any issues even should it be applied
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see supra text accompanying notes 71–72.
See supra Part II.A.2.
239 See supra text accompanying note 198.
240 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also supra text
accompanying note 82.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 94–97.
238

BLEVINS GALLEYSPROOFS2

930

2/25/2016 10:08 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:893

because the injury suffered would flow directly from the loss at the inter partes
reexamination.242 This solution even avoids the policy underlying these
prudential concerns; the injury is neither one shared by many nor one that
flowed from being a citizen of the United States, and the separation of powers
concerns of Flast and Frothingham243 do not appear here because the judiciary
already has jurisdiction to review agency activity.244
In fact, the only prudential consideration potentially implicated by this
solution is the general prohibition on bringing cases on behalf of third
parties.245 After all, public interest organizations advocate for the interests of
third parties almost by definition.246 Arguments before the judiciary, even
having found grounds for standing under the system proposed, will be based on
the interests of the public, including people who are not members of the
organizations arguing on their behalf.247 Conveniently, courts have recognized
some exceptions to this prudential consideration which may apply to the
circumstance described in the solution herein.248 But, in reality, those
exceptions are unnecessary. The standing of a party under the proposed system
is based on the monetary injury suffered by the organization, not on the public
interest in challenging the patent at issue. Further, as the Court established in
Sierra Club, parties may argue a case based on public interest once a personal,
economic injury flowing from an agency action has established standing.249
In sum, the proposed system meets all the requirements for standing and
then some. Given that suits in federal court will come as appeals from
administrative rulings, only the injury-in-fact requirement must be fulfilled.
Given that the harm is economic in nature, personally suffered, and flowing
from the ruling, that requirement is certainly met. The injury of the
organization here likely goes beyond that minimum requirement to fulfill the
full constitutional test required outside the context of administrative appeals.
Further, the solution proposed above avoids any prudential concerns in the
standing doctrine even though none of them need apply in the context of such
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See supra Part III.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 111–14.
244 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
245 See supra notes 115–16.
246 See supra text accompanying note 48.
247 As implied above, this concern is not implicated when an organization is arguing on behalf of its
members. See supra text accompanying notes 169–71.
248 See supra text accompanying notes 119–21.
249 See supra text accompanying notes 166–67.
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appeals. The procedural validity of the standing conferred in the solution
proposed is simply above contestation.
The proposed solution also addresses the underlying policy concerns in the
standing doctrine in order to promote its worth and viability. First, the system
described avoids any separation of powers concerns which standing protects.250
The proposed change does not create any additional scope of judicial review
over agency action. Instead, the system only allows more parties—namely
public interest organizations as representatives of the public—to make use of
the right to judicial review which already exists, both in agency review and in
determinations of patent validity. Thus, the solution does not create any
additional overlap in powers expressly reserved for any branches of the federal
government.
Second, the system described honors the central concern of protecting
federal courts from being procedurally overwhelmed, substantively abused, or
politically compromised.251 For the first consideration, the proposal here only
contemplates the recognition of a handful of public interest organizations,
meaning that the number of parties which can bring suit to challenge BPAI
rulings will only expand nominally.252 Indeed, the beauty of this system largely
lies in the fact that it practically privatizes the policing of potential suits for
worthwhile controversies. The accountability mechanism monitoring
participating organizations253 ensures that those organizations will be
particularly selective in deciding which causes to champion in federal court.
Further, the expense of litigation, both monetarily and in opportunity cost, will
dissuade organizations further from taking up frivolous challenges to patent
validity. Thus, the new system will lead to the public interest organizations
bearing the brunt of the flood of potential litigants and reducing that flood to a
relatively miniscule trickle of worthwhile cases which then reach federal court
through appeal.254 Further, the number of additional cases will be limited by
the limited types of invalidity challenges available in inter partes
reexamination.255
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See supra text accompanying notes 200–04.
See supra text accompanying notes 208–12.
252 See supra Part III.A.
253 See supra Part III.A.
254 This burden is borne by the public interest organizations in the sense that members of the public,
wishing to have their voices heard in patent litigation, will have to find one of the eligible public interest
organizations to take up their respective causes. See supra Part III.A.
255 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (limiting the scope of inter partes review).
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As for the gravity of the cases brought, many of these features also serve to
ensure the importance of the cases reaching the courts. Beyond the advantages
of the mechanisms, though, by their very nature cases implicating interests of
the national public are very likely significant enough to merit the courts’
attentions. Thus, any politically charged issues which may be brought up in
litigation that stems from this solution, at the least, will not be brought up
frivolously. Regardless, courts of late have hardly been reluctant to hear cases
deciding hotly contested political issues,256 and the public deserves to have its
voice heard given that it is transitively endorsing the protections given to
patent holders.
Third, the proposed solution preserves the integrity of the litigation both by
providing a zealous advocate and by providing an injury in fact as a basis for
the adjudication. Public interest organizations exist purely to promote and
protect the interests of their members and the public at large as they relate to
the causes on which they focus.257 It is difficult to imagine a more zealous
candidate for advocacy. Further, the monetary injury suffered by the
organization would create an easy, centralizing issue to be litigated: the
validity of the BPAI’s ruling and, transitively, the validity of the patent.
Accordingly, litigation surrounding these issues will not be diluted or
weakened by the expansion of standing to include such circumstances.
Fourth and finally, the proposed solution does not constitute
“intermeddling litigation”258 under the meaning given in standing policy. This
policy consideration least of all creates concern over the proposed solution
simply because the public inherently has a stake in all patent grants, so the
notion that a public interest organization would be butting into areas in which
they have no vested interest is simply incoherent. Accordingly, the solution
given above in Part III.A not only passes all of the mechanical tests for
standing but also honors each of the underlying considerations within the
standing doctrine.
2. Receiving Support from Policy Underlying Patent Law
The public benefit and public service notions underlying patent law further
support the proposal outlined in Part III.A. As discussed in Part I.B, the
256

See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
While this assertion may seem naïve as applied generally, the system proposed will ensure that the
organizations selected for this program are of the commendable variety. See supra Part III.A.
258 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
257
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granting of a patent amounts to a public endorsement of the protections given
to the patent holder.259 The public only gives this endorsement, however, in
exchange for the public benefit received from the practice of the patent.260
Based on these two principles, patent law almost certainly promotes the notion
of public involvement in the patent system, either to challenge those products
which the public is perceived to endorse or to challenge those protections for
products which the public believes are too important to grant exclusive
protections on them.
The implementation of the solution described may also lead to the
improvement of the quality of patents generally. For instance, public interest
organizations have to first challenge the patent in question through inter partes
reexamination—and lose—in order for the proposed system to function
properly. This requirement clearly spells an increase in activity at the PTO by
necessarily vigilant public interest organizations, which could lead to the
improved function of the office itself. While this Comment focuses on
challenges to patents on the basis of public interest, these organizations may
develop into general third-party patent police, catching useless or otherwise
invalid patents which may slip through the cracks in the examination process.
This additional vigilance would likely improve the health of the patent system
overall—independent of providing a much-needed avenue for seeking judicial
review on behalf of the public.
This public benefit outweighs any potential harm to patent protections
coming as a result of the expansion described in this Comment. The system
described could weaken the patent system in the sense that, if the rights of
patent holders may be subject to further expensive litigation, innovators may
be more reluctant to use the patent system at all. However, the narrowly drawn
nature of the expansion proposed here serves as much to limit the harmful
effect on patent protections as it does to observe the principles of standing.
Further, it is worth noting that this expansion does not affect the substance of
patent law in any way; it does not subject patents to materially new types of
challenges, only more challenges of the same type. As a result, the types of
reasonable challenges which may be brought also limit the number of cases
that may come as a result of this expansion. When the patent does come,
though, implicating a major point of public interest, the avenue will be present
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See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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for the public to speak to its will regarding the validity of that patent in federal
court.
The recent trends in patent law favoring the rights of the public further
suggest that the solution proposed here is both commendable and timely.261 As
an example, the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, while not
particularly helpful in application, acknowledged that parties may have stakes
in patent litigation beyond what has been traditionally contemplated by the
Federal Circuit.262 Further, the Supreme Court’s eBay decision may represent
recognition on the part of the Court that public use of patented subject matter
outweighs the exclusive rights of the patent holder.263 Finally, anti-troll
jurisprudence tends to lend itself to user rights generally instead of formally
favoring strong patent rights.264 Thus, the recognition of the public voice
through the proposed system vastly outweighs whatever negligible detriment
this expansion visits upon the protections given in patent law.
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See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The proposal outlined in this Comment offers a much-needed recourse in
federal court for public interest organizations to challenge the validity of
patents on behalf of the public.265 Further, that solution meets all of the
mechanical requirements of the federal standing doctrine while simultaneously
respecting policies underlying both standing and patent law. Its
implementation does not require congressional action and thus does not face
particularly potent political hurdles to adoption. All that remains is the
enactment of the doctrine through the legal avenues described herein. In so
doing, the PTO and federal courts can allow the public to challenge patents
that could have a major impact on national progress, either socially or
technologically. Regardless, implementing such an improvement in the midst
of a crescendo of user rights could resurrect the public voice in patent law in a
meaningful and lasting way without compromising the benefits of the patent
system as a whole.
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